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Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean-roll!
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
Man marks the earth with ruin-his control
Stops with the shore. -Lord Byron
Saving Byron's Sea: Federal and State
Regulation of Oil Pollution from
Ocean Petroleum Production
By WILLIAM JOHN RATHJ-E*
I. The Oil Spill Problem
M AN'S principal contacts with the oceans are limited to the con-
tinental shelves.1  His direct contact is limited to an even smaller
area-the coastal zone-a narrow strip of water along the edge of the
land-sea interface. The coastal zone waters form the aquatic recrea-
tion base2 and are the spawning grounds of most marine fish.3 Un-
fortunately, these same waters receive most of the wastes from the
coastal zone population and most of the pollutants created by industrial
* B.A., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1970, Hastings College of
the Law; Member, California Bar Association.
1. The continental shelf is the zone around a continent extending from the low-
water line to the depth at which there is a marked increase of slope in the floor bottom
to a greater depth. Conventionally, the increase of slope occurs at 200 meters. W.
YAsso, OCEANOGRAPHY 82-83 (1965); see, International Committee on the Nomencla-
ture of Ocean Bottom Features, [19561 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 131, U.N. Doc. A/CN.
4/Ser. A (1956).
2. "[Tlhe demand for marine recreation ... will probably continue to increase,
at a rate greater than the rate of population growth." UNvEasrrY oF CALIFORNIA,
CALIFORNIA AND THE USE OF THE OcEAN: A PLANNING STUDY OF AIAlNE RESOURCEs
5-5 (1969).
3. Increased population growth makes fish one of the most important resources
of the oceans. The sea is already an important source of high quality animal pro-
tein-15 percent of the world's supply of protein presently comes from the oceans.
The oceans could be a source of animal protein for 6 million people by 1980.
Schaefer, Freedom of Scientific Research and Exploration in the Sea, 4 STAN J. OF INT'L
STUDms 46, 52 (1969). Pollution, however, presents a special danger for fish protein
resources because the productivity of fish is limited to offshore areas close to the
shoreline where powerful upwelling currents bring nutrients to the surface, and it is in
these areas where pollution is more serious. Ehrlich & Ehrlich, The Food from the Sea
Myth, SATURDAY REVIEW Apr. 4, 1970, at 53, 54.
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development of the ocean.4
The coastal zone readily lends itself to multiple uses.' Because the
zone contains several vital marine resources which more than one in-
dustry will attempt to utilize,6 there is an immediate need to assess
the benefits each use will involve and to regulate and control the costs
resulting from the development of any single marine resource. One of
these costs is the introduction into the ocean of harmful pollutants, such
as hydrocarbon oil,7 which jeopardizes the present and future avail-
ability of other important natural resources.
The development of petroleum resources located in submerged
lands contributes substantially to the discharge of oil into the oceans.
Although the amount of oil presently released by the offshore petroleum
industry is not as great as that released by onshore industries, 8 offshore
petroleum drilling involves the danger of massive discharges of oil into
the marine environment. Such discharges may significantly affect other
beneficial uses of marine resources.9 Moreover, the growth of the ocean
4. E.g., CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MARINE & COASTAL RESOURCES,
PROCEEDINGS OF SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 53 (1969).
5. See, e.g., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which provides in sec-
tion 3(a) for the development of comprehensive pollution control programs by the
states to conserve waters for the following purposes: "public water supplies, prop-
agation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricul-
tural, industrial and other legitimate uses." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (1970). For the
legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see note 59 infra. See
also National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 433lb(3)
(Supp. V, 1970); Wilkes, Consideration of Anticipatory Uses in Decisions on Coastal
Development, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 354 (1969).
6. To date, the development of ocean petroleum reserves represents the
area to which private industry has devoted the greatest financial effort. Already the
petroleum industry has invested $7 billion in the development of these resources, and
the present offshore investment rate of $1 billion per year is expected to exceed $25
billion per year over the next decade. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING
& RESOURCES, PANEL REPORTS ON MARINE RESOURCES AND LEGAL-POLITICAL ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT VII-190 (1969). On the average, an offshore well
costs $220,000 to construct; operating costs run $6,000 to $25,000 per day. While the
costs per well drilled are high, the costs per unit of output are low compared to on-
shore production. Erickson, Crude Oil Prices, Drilling Incentives and the Supply of
Well Discoveries, 10 NAT. RES. J. 27, 49-51 (1970).
7. Hydrocarbon oil refers to any of various oily liquids consisting chiefly of
mixtures of organic compounds containing carbon and hydrogen; as used in this paper,
it refers to petroleum in its crude state: a bituminous liquid with a disagreeable odor.
See 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 895 (1956 ed.).
8. It has been estimated that 30 million pounds of oil were released into the
Santa Barbara Channel after the blowout of the Union Oil Company well that was
being drilled there; 60 million pounds of waste is dumped into the ocean by Los Ange-
les annually and about half of this may be hydrocarbon oil. CALIFORNIA ADVlSORY
COMMISSION ON MARINE & COASTAL RESOURCES, supra note 4, at 53.
9. Short term effects include the death of waterbirds and fish because of coating
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petroleum industry may involve an increasing number of oil spill inci-
dents unless new ways are found to prevent their occurrence. 10
This article is principally concerned with existing legal controls de-
signed to minimize the incidence -of oil pollution resulting from the de-
velopment of marine petroleum resources. Primary attention is focused
on identifying the legislative and adminstrative framework developed
by the Federal Government and the State of California to prevent oil
spill incidents. Secondary consideration is given to delineating inade-
quacies in the governmental approaches to the oil spill problem and to
making some general recommendations for new legislative action."
Attention is also given to the question of the liability of the offshore oil
industry to individuals for claims arising from oil spills.
At the outset it may be stated that the environmental costs to so-
ciety of pollution resulting from ocean petroleum drilling probably
have not been sufficiently evaluated by those administrative agencies
regulating petroleum production in the oceans. Nevertheless, existing
premises on which is based the argument for continuing offshore drilling
are accepted for the purposes of this article. These premises are: (1)
there is a current need to recover oil reserves located in the oceans for
immediate energy requirements and (2) damages which may occur to
other marine resources are part of the costs of developing vital petroleum
reserves.'2  Even accepting these premises, however, it is apparent that
by oil, loss of use of recreational areas, damage to harbors and ports-with attendant
navigational and fire hazards and direct economic costs in terms of expenses incurred
to clean up an oil spill. Possible long term effects include the deterioration of food
resources through the breakdown of food chains upon which advanced fish forms
depend. See, e.g., DEP'Ts OF INTERIOR & TRANSPORTATION, OIL POLLUTION, A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT 3-4 (1968).
10. One estimate, extrapolated from present figures on wells drilled, is that one
major pollution incident from offshore drilling will occur every year. Executive Office
of the President, Offshore Marine Resources: A Challenge and An Opportunity, 2ND
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON On. SPiLLs 3 (1969).
11. It should be noted that because of different approaches among various states
to preventing ocean oil pollution from offshore drilling, solutions proposed in this
paper that might significantly reduce oil pollution in ocean waters off the coast of
California may not have a similar impact insofar as other states are concerned.
The legal framework for the prevention of pollution from offshore drilling established
by the State of Louisiana is set forth in 2 PuBLic LAND LAW REvIEw COMMIssIoN,
DE'r OF INTERIOR, STUDY OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED
STATEs 12-A-23 to 12-A-34 (1969). For that of Texas, see id. at 12-A-28 to 12-A-34.
See also Richey, A Comparison of Oil and Gas Leasing in the Gulf of Mexico (States
of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and the Federal Government), and the luris-
dictional Conflict Over the Boundary Between State and Federal Authority in the Gulf
of Mexico, 40 Miss. L. 349 (1969 [hereinafter cited as Richey, Oil and Gas Leasing
in the Gulf of Mexico].
12. "Oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids are by far the most valuable re-
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not enough is being done to minimize the occurrence of oil pollution
from offshore drilling operations; other marine resources are being
jeopardized by oil pollution, and little is being done to reduce the social
costs that the loss of these resources will involve.
II. Jurisdiction Over Submerged California Lands
A. The Problem
The submerged lands in the coastal zone waters off California are
within the jurisdiction of both the State of California and the Federal
Government. 13  This division of authority constitutes a major impedi-
ment to rational administrative control of offshore petroleum production
and has produced predictable conflict and confusion between the govern-
mental entitites involved in regulating the development of natural re-
sources in the submerged coastal lands. Petroleum companies follow
different regulations when drilling in federal waters than when drilling
in waters subject to the control of the state. 4 Different administrators
and inspectors, following different guidelines, check to determine if oil
companies are complying with drilling regulations. 5 In the event of a
spill, different agencies are concerned with clean-up procedures. 16 Fi-
nally, both the state and federal administrative agencies have the au-
sources now produced from the continental shelves, and they are the resources that
have the greatest prospective value for the future as well." 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, POTENTIAL MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE
UNITED STATES OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 5-A-22 (1969). See also M. McDouGAL
& W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 631-32 (1962); T. NELSON, THE
UNDERWATER SEARCH FOR OIL AND GAS, A FORUM ON OCEANOGRAPHY (1967).
13. The development of this dual sovereignty is discussed infra at text accom-
panying notes 19-38.
14. It was suggested, following the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill involving the
Union Oil Company well located in federal waters, that federal regulations were not as
strict as state regulations (especially on the subject of well casings which are designed to
prevent well blowouts), and that if the well had been drilled in conformity with state
standards, the blowout would not have occurred. E.g., testimony of Sen. George Mur-
phy in Hearings on S. 7 and S. 544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Subcomm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 471 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544]; testimony of Kerry Mulligan, Chairman of the
California Water Resources Control Board, in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Flood
Control and the Subcomm. on Rivers and Harbors of the House Committee on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 83 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Flood Control Hearings].
15. No federal inspections had been performed on the Union Oil Company well
in the Santa Barbara Channel before it blew out. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra
note 14, at 696.
16. There was considerable confusion among members of the Department of the
Interior as to whether federal legislation, concerned with liability for the costs of
cleaning-up an oil spill, could be imposed on lessees of state submerged lands. Id.
at 952-54. Under the Submerged Lands Act § 11, 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964),
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thority to allow drilling anywhere in the areas of their respective control,
despite the protestations of the other government.
17
Inherent in this dual system of regulations and responsibilities is
the possibility of error resulting from confusion. This problem has not
yet been the cause of a massive oil spill disaster, but as the number of
offshore wells proliferates the absence of a single authority to control
those developing the submerged lands will aggravate rather than dimin-
ish the possibilities of further pollution.' s
B. The Development of Dual Sovereignty
Until 1947 California claimed exclusive ownership over the sub-
merged lands and authority for its claim was found in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States." California therefore began
developing its offshore marine resources without fear of federal inter-
ference and became the first state in the nation to conduct oil drilling in
ocean waters.20  In 1894 oil was discovered in the Summerland area
(Santa Barbara County) and drilling commenced from ocean wells on
piers extending out from the shore.21 One of the richest early strikes in
the West occurred in 1928 at Elwood off a pier in the ocean, and
California then began granting leases of submerged ocean lands to oil
the Federal Government, although surrendering to the states the right to develop re-
sources in submerged ocean lands, did not surrender its authority to impose liability for
costs to remove oil discharged onto navigable waters.
17. In 1967, Santa Barbara officials asked the Department of the Interior to im-
pose a large federal buffer zone off the coast of California at Santa Barbara opposite
a state sanctuary on oil drilling. Santa Barbara officials feared that federal drilling near
the state sanctuary would drain oil from state lands and force the California State
Lands Commission to grant leases in the sanctuary area to protect state oil. Hearings
on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 280. The Federal Government did grant a limited
2-mile wide buffer strip. See note 137 infra.
18. The Marine Resources Panel of the Commission on Marine, Science, En-
gineering and Resources has concluded that: "Additional cooperation and understanding
between industry and the federal and state governments are necessary to facilitate the
multi-use approach to all offshore areas." COMMISSION ON MARINE ScIENcE, ENGINEER-
iNo & REsouRcEs, supra note 6, at VIII-187.
19. States own title to the lands and minerals underlying the navigable waters
within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Pollard's Lessee v. Hogan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212 (1845). States own title to the lands underlying the tidewaters (between
the high and low tidemarks) within their respective boundaries. Borax, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). In 1928, the California Supreme Court ruled that min-
erals underlying submerged lands belonged to the state as opposed to coastal prop-
erty owners. Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928).
20. An extensive analysis of the history of the development of California off-
shore oil leasing is given in Krueger, State Tidelands Leasing in California, 5 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 427, 429 (1958).
21. Id.
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companies, receiving in return royalties of 5 percent on the value of all
oil extracted.
22
In 1945, however, when California was already fully engaged in
offshore petroleum development, President Truman proclaimed that the
Federal Government had jurisdiction and control over the natural re-
sources of the seabed contiguous to the coasts of the United States; he
also called for a major effort to develop the petroleum resources lo-
cated there.23 Two years later, in United States v. California,24 the Su-
preme Court ruled that the Federal Government, rather than California,
had full dominion over the land and resources under the waters off the
coast. In its final decree the Court stated:
The United States of America is now, and has been at all times
pertinent thereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full domin-
ion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things, underly-
ing the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark
on the coast of California, and outside of the inland waters, ex-
tending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north
and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries
of the State of California. The State of California has no title
thereto or property interest therein.25
Congress, having learned that the Federal Government did in fact
own the submerged lands in the waters off the nation's coasts, pro-
ceeded to return to the states the right to continue dealing with a portion
of these lands as if they belonged to the states. The enabling legislation
was the Submerged Lands Act. 26  The passage of the act reflected the
view of a substantial majority of Congressmen that submerged ocean
22. Since oil leases were first granted by the state, California has received $800
million in tax revenue from offshore oil development; the money is used to finance the
development of a state water plan and higher education. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544,
supra note 14, at 271. The County of Santa Barbara receives oil royalties of up to
$75,000 per mile of public beach that it has opposite to leases owned by the State of
California. Id. at 279.
23. 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945); 13 STATE DEP'T BULL. 485 (1945). At one
time President Truman set aside the whole continental shelf as a naval petroleum re-
serve. Exec. Order No. 10,426, 3 C.F.R. 924 (1953).
24. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). For an extensive discussion of the history of the
struggle over ownership of the valuable submerged lands off the coast of California,
Lousiana and Texas, see E. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY: A LEGAL
AND HisToiucAL ANALYsIs (1953).
25. 332 U.S. 804, 905 (1947). Similar rulings followed with respect to the State
of Louisiana in United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and the State of
Texas in United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1964). The constitutionality of the act, as an ex-
ercise of congressional power under article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, which
vests Congress with the power to dispose of property belonging to the United States,
was sustained in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1953).
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resources should be controlled by the states rather than by the Federal
Government.
2 7
Pursuant to the act, California received jurisdiction over a 3-mile
strip of land off its coastline2 together with the right to develop and
manage the natural resources in the submerged lands in the 
area. 29
The act provides:
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1)
title to and owernship of the lands beneath navigable waters within
the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources
within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to man-
age, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural
resources all in accordance with applicable State law be .. .as-
signed to the respective States .... 30
The Submerged Lands Act did not affect the Federal Govern-
ment's ownership of the submerged lands lying beyond the limit of con-
trol transferred to the states. Congress subsequently reaffirmed this
ownership with the enactment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
in 1953.31 This act declares it to be the policy of the United States
that "the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf [defined for
California as submerged lands seaward of the 3-mile strip of land over
which California exercises control]12 appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." 3
3
The Outer Continental Shelf Act clearly expresses congressional
desire to involve the Federal Government in the lucrative practice of
leasing offshore lands to oil companies for petroleum development.3 4
27. E. BARTLEY, supra note 24, at 213-16. Among the motives of persons
mentioned as being in favor of quitclaiming part of the submerged ocean lands back to
the states were the desire of Congressmen from the affected states to regain control
over the oil-rich submerged lands; some Republicans to embarrass President Truman;
and the desire of some Congressmen to please the oil and gas lobby. See Metcalfe,
The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem,
4 SYRAcusE L. REv. 39 (1957).
28. For discussion of the continuing problem of determining how the 3-mile
area of the undersea lands is to be measured, see Richey, Oil and Gas Leasing in the
Gulf of Mexico, supra note 11, at 371-79 and Browning, Some Aspects of State and
Federal furisdiction in the Marine Environment, in PROCEEDINGSS THE LAW OF THE
SEA INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrvERsrrY OF RHODE ISLAND 88
(1968).
29. Natural resources include, but are not limited to, gas, oil, all other minerals,
fish and other marine and plant life. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1964).
30. Id. § 1311(a).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1964). An extensive analysis of the history and
provisions of the act is given in Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1969).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
33. Id. § 1332(a).
34. It has been noted that the act embodies a congressional policy that natural
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The bulk of the act sets forth general provisions relating to oil and gas
leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf area. It further provides that
mineral leases are to be maintained in accordance with provisions spe-
cified in the act,35 vests the Secretary of the Interior with the power to
enact regulations to protect natural resources in the Outer Continental
Shelf area36 and specifies sanctions for the violation of these regula-
tions. 7
Petroleum drilling on federally-controlled submerged lands off the
coast of California began in 1966. Major leasing commenced in 1968
when the Department of the Interior offered 100 blocks of submerged
ocean lands for lease; 75 of the blocks were leased by petroleum com-
panies, and the Federal Government received $603 million from the
bids. Only 15 of the blocks have been developed by the petroleum in-
dustry to date, but each lease area, after full development, has a poten-
tial for 150 wells. Consequently, 11,000 wells may eventually be
drilled in the Outer Continental Shelf area as a result of the 1968 leas-
ing38
III. Federal and State Laws Governing Offshore
Petroleum Production
A. The Problem
As long as there is offshore drilling for petroleum resources, there
will also be the specter of serious oil pollution disasters. Offshore
petroleum production is presently considered a vital and developing
industry, however,3 9 and there is little likelihood that drilling in the
resources in the Outer Continental Shelf area be developed by private enterprises in
accordance with leasing procedures specified by the act. Stone, Legal Aspects of Oil
and Gas Operations, 8 NAT. RES. J. 478, 484 (1968).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1964). This provision prevents state laws from
having any effect in the Outer Continental Shelf area insofar as the leasing of minerals
is concerned; otherwise, state laws, to the extent they are not inconsistent with fed-
eral laws, are applicable in offshore waters controlled by the Federal Government.
Id. § 1333(a)(2). See Rodriguez v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1964).
37. Id. § 1334(a)(2).
38. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 298. At present there are more
than 6,000 wells in federal waters off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana. Id. at 320.
39. In the United States, three-fourths of all energy requirements come from oil
and gas resources. In 1966, 9 percent of the domestic production of petroleum,
which accounts for approximately 86 percent of the world's supply, came from ma-
rine resources. MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRS, SECOND REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE
CONGRESS ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT 215 (1968).
Current United States production of petroleum fluids offshore has an annual value
of $1.16 billion. Cumulative production from offshore drilling, through 1966, totaled
2.2 billion barrels of oil; estimates of the amount of recoverable crude oil from the
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oceans will be discontinued. It is therefore essential to determine how
the probability of oil spill occurrences can be most effectively minimized.
Oil spills from offshore petroleum drilling primarily result from
blow-out accidents which occur during the drilling, logging and casing
phases of production operations. 40  Well blow-outs usually occur
when pressures in the well bore are less than the pressures in the geologi-
cal strata through which the well is being drilled; when the pressure on
the well bore becomes too great, the well implodes, forcing oil, salt
water and other substances to the surface of the ocean.
4' Pollution
from offshore petroleum drilling, however, is not an automatic conse-
quence of production operations. Rather, it is the product of one or
more factors which include the following: (1) human error during
drilling operations; (2) failure of safety equipment during drilling op-
erations; and (3) decisions to ignore governmental drilling regulations
designed to minimize the likelihood of oil spill occurrences.
For several years both the Federal Government and the State of
California were concerned only with the revenues generated by the leas-
ing of coastal waters for offshore petroleum exploitation.
42 The recent
Santa Barbara oil spill and increasing public concern for the protection
of marine ecosystems, however, have encouraged these governmental
bodies to improve their means of insuring that development of marine
oil resources does not involve social costs, in the form of pollution of
other marine resources, that the public is unwilling to bear. Both the
Federal Government and California have sought to find a combination
of legal controls that will minimize the incidence of oil pollution from off-
shore petroleum resources development. Their attention has focused on
two legal devices-characterized broadly as "regulations" and "sanc-
tions"-designed to compel offshore petroleum drillers to exercise
greater than normal care to avoid oil pollution of the marine environ-
ment.
United States Pacific Outer Continental Shelf is 12 billion barrels. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
POTENTIAL MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
5-A 7. See also Barrow, ECONOMICS OF OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, in EXPLORATION
AND ECONOMICS OF THE PETROLEUrM INDUSTRY 133 (1967); Nelson & Burke, Petroleum
Resources of the Continental Margins of the United States, in EXPLOITiNG THE OCEANS
116 (Marine Technology Society 1966).
40. A study of ocean oil production technology is contained in the Report of the
Secretary General to the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the Re-
sources of the Sea, U.N. Doe. E/499/Add. 1, at 54-73 (1968).
41. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 634-35.
42. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, HEARINGS OF THE JOINT TEDELANDs
COMMISSION (1964).
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B. The Approach of the Federal Government
Federal jurisdiction over the development of ocean petroleum re-
sources and the protection of the marine environment from pollution is
exercised by the Department of the Interior." Within that department,
two bureaus prepare rules and regulations governing the development of
submerged oil resources. The Bureau of Land Management adminis-
ters a program for the development of marine resources in the Outer
Continental Shelf areas through the issuance of leases for submerged
lands to private industry.44  The United States Geological Survey
(USGS) supervises the operations of private oil companies in the Outer
Continental Shelf areas45 and is charged with controlling petroleum
production operations so as to protect the ocean from pollution.40  Two
other federal agencies are responsible for insuring that drilling platforms
do not become obstructions to navigation (Army Corps of Engineers) 47
and enforcing federal laws in the Outer Continental Shelf (United
States Coast Guard).48
The United States Geological Survey discharges its responsibility
of protecting marine resources from pollution primarily by enacting ad-
ministrative regulations applicable to lessees of Outer Continental Shelf
lands. These regulations fall into two categories: (1) those which in-
form offshore drilling operators of their responsibility to avoid polluting
the marine environment and (2) those which set minimum technical
operating standards designed to minimize pollution by preventing well
blow-outs or the escape of oil in the event of a blow-out.
1. The Responsibilities of Drilling Operators
Until recently the principal regulation dealing with the responsi-
bility of offshore drilling operators to avoid polluting the oceans pro-
vided:
The lessee shall not pollute the waters of the high seas or damage
43. The Outer Continental Shelf Act specifically charges the Secretary of the
Interior with responsibility for administration of oil production operations. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a)(1) (1964). See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
44. The general duties of the Bureau of Land Management are set forth at 43
U.S.C. H9 2-23 (1964). For regulations codified by this bureau, see 43 C.F.R. ch.
H (1970).
45. The general duties of the United States Geological Survey are set forth at
43 U.S.C. H9 31-50 (1964). For regulations codified by this bureau, see 30 C.F.R. ch.
II (1970).
46. 30 C.F.R. H9 250.1, 250.12 (1970).
47. 33 U.S.C. §H 540-45 (1964).
48. 14 id. § 2.
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the aquatic life of the sea or allow extraneous matter to enter and
damage any mineral or water bearing formation. .... 49
A second regulation repeated this vague theme of care for the marine en-
vironment: "The lessee shall take all reasonable precautions to prevent
damage or waste of any natural resource or injury to. .. the aquatic
life of the seas." 50  In addition, the Department of the Interior's Re-
gional Oil and Gas Supervisor for the Pacific Coast Region, responsible
for supervising offshore drill operations in California waters,
51 had
promulgated a regulation requiring oil and gas well drilling operations
to be conducted in such a manner as to preclude the pollution of the
waters of the Pacific Ocean.52
Following the Santa Barbara pollution disaster, Secretary of the
Interior Hickel added a new section to the major USGS administrative
regulation on pollution. 3 This section made offshore oil operators lia-
ble, without proof of fault, for pollution damage to aquatic life, wildlife
and private property and for all the costs of cleaning-up pollutants. The
regulation provided:
Present See. 250.42 is designated as 250.42(a) and a new
paragraph (b) is added to read as follows:
(b) If the waters of the high seas are polluted by the drill-
ing or production operations of the lessee, and such pollution dam-
ages or threatens to damage aquatic life, wildlife, or public or pri-
vate property, the control and removal of the pollutant and the
reparation of any damage, to whomsoever occurring, proximately
resulting therefrom shall be at the expense of the lessee, and on fail-
ure of the lessee to control and remove the pollutants the Super-
visor, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies of the federal,
state and local governments, or in cooperation with the lessee, or
both, shall have the right to accomplish the control and removal of
the pollutant at the cost of the lessee, but such action shall not re-
lieve the lessee for responsibility for reparation of damages as pro-
vided herein. 54
On August 22, 1969, the whole division of title 30 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (part 250) was republished and the regulations
pertaining to offshore drilling were again changed.55 Section 250.43
of the Code of Federal Regulations replaced section 250.42 and was
reworded to provide:
49. 30 C.F.R. § 250.42 (1969).
50. Id. § 250.30 (1969).
51. A regional supervisor is a representative of the Secretary of the Interior au-
thorized to regulate offshore oil operations and to perform other duties prescribed
by USGS regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 250.2(c) (1970).
52. Outer Continental Shelf Order No. 7, Pacific Region, March 31, 1965.
53. 34 Fed. Reg. 2503 (1969).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. 34 Fed. Reg. 13544-47 (1969).
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(a) The lessee shall not pollute land or water or damage the
aquatic life of the sea or allow extraneous matter to enter and dam-
age any mineral or water-bearing formation. . . . All spills or
leakage of oil or waste materials shall be recorded by the lessee and,
upon request of the supervisor, shall be reported . . . . All spills
or leakage of a substantial size or quantity . . and those of any
size or quantity which cannot be immediately controlled shall also
be reported . . to the supervisor and to the Coast Guard and to
the Regional Director of the Federal Water Pollution Control Ad-
ministration ...
(b) If the waters of the sea are polluted by the drilling or
production operations conducted by or on behalf of the lessee, and
such pollution damages or threatens to damage aquatic life, wild-
life, or public or private property, the control or total removal of
the pollutant, wheresoever found, proximately resulting therefrom
shall be at the expense of the lessee. Upon failure of the lessee to
control and remove the pollutant, the supervisor, in cooperation
with other appropriate agencies of the Federal, State and local gov-
ernments or in cooperation with the lessee, or both, shall have the
right to accomplish the control and removal of the pollutant . . .
at the cost of the lessee. Such action shall not relieve the lessee
of any responsibility as provided herein.
(c) The lessee's liability to third parties, other than for clean-
ing up the pollutant in accordance with paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion shall be governed by applicable law.5 6
Under both regulations, oil companies were no longer responsible
merely for avoiding oil spill incidents; they now are liable for cleaning
them up. Strict liabillity thus replaced moral persuasion in USGS regu-
lations defining the responsibility of oil companies to the marine en-
vironment. Under the present section 250.43, however, this liability
only extends to the costs of removal of a pollutant; it does not extend
to reparation for damages as was provided by the superseded section
250.42(b).
There has been some question as to whether the new regulation is
applicable to lessees holding leases granted before its promulgation,
since the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides that lessees are
subject only to compliance with regulations "in force and effect on the
date of the issuance of the lease."'57 Secretary Hickel took the position
that the newly enacted regulation was applicable to all lessees because
it was not a new regulation but merely an interpretation of an old
regulation.5 8 This problem has now been mooted, however, by the
passage of the water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,"9 which pro-
56. 30 C.F.R. § 250.43 (1970).
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2) (1964).
58. Hearings on H.R. 6495, H.R. 6609, H.R. 6794 and H.R. 7325 Before the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1969).
59. 84 Stat. 91, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155,
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hibits the discharge of oil in any harmful quantities into coastal waters
of the United States. 60 A discharge of oil is considered harmful if it
violates applicable water quality standards or causes a film, sheen or
discoloration of surface waters or adjoining shorelines.
61
Pursuant to the Water Quality Improvement Act, an owner or op-
erator of an offshore drilling facility is fully liable for the removal of
oil that is intentionally 2 or negligently discharged into the navigable
waters of the United States (except where permitted).
63  In the event
of an accidental discharge, however, the liability for the costs of removal
is limited to $8 million. 4 A revolving fund of $35 million is estab-
lished by the act to allow the Federal Government to actually remove
the pollutant in the event the polluter fails to do so.6d Apparently, the
act supersedes the stricter regulations of the Department of the Interior
on the same subject.06 It is nevertheless an improvement over prior
1948, as amended, Water Pollution Control Act Extension of 1952, 66 Stat. 755; Water
Pollution Control Amendments of 1956, 70 Stat. 498; Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments of 1961, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903; Clean
Water Restoration Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1246. The Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970 was an amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and will be
cited hereinafter to that act. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, in turn, is
codified in 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970) and will be cited hereinafter as FWPCA.
Pursuant to Executive Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, all functions vested in the
Secretary of the Interior or Department of the Interior by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act were transferred to the newly created Environmental Protection Agency.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2996-97
(August 20, 1970).
60. FWPCA § 11(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(2) (1970).
61. 18 C.F.R. § 610.4 (1970).
62. There is a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for any intentional discharge.
FWPCA § 11(b)(5), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(5) (1970).
63. Id. § II(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(2).
64. Id. § 1l(f)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(f)(2). For shipowners, there is no
liability for discharges resulting from an act of God, an act of war or the negligence of
the Federal Government. Id. § (f)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(f)(1). If the owner
removes the oil he may recover his reasonable costs from the Federal Government.
Id. § 11(i)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(i)(1). The same defenses are available under the
act to offshore drilling operators. If the operator removes the oil, however, he cannot
recover his removal expenses since the act provides that the recovery of costs provision
shall not apply where liability exists under the Continental Shelf Lands Act. Id.
§ 11(i)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(i)(2). Strict liability has been established under
USGS regulations enacted pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. See note
56 & accompanying text, supra.
65. Id. § l1(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(g). The act also vests the President of
the United States with the authority to require a United States attorney to abate an
actual or threatened discharge of oil into navigable waters. Id. § 11(e), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1161(e).
66. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. on Public Works,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1969) (testimony of Secretary Hickel).
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federal law which did not reach the question of economic responsibility
in the event of an oil spill.
2. Technical Standards for Drilling Operations
The Geological Survey also enacts technical regulations designed
to minimize the danger of pollution by preventing well blow-outs due to
human error or equipment failure.6 7  These technical regulations set
minimum operating standards that are intended to reduce the probability
of oil well blow-outs under normal circumstances. The regulations
focus on three important areas of well drilling: (1) the casing of wells
by cement down to specific depths to prevent oil fluids from entering
the ocean through the well bore because of pressure on the bore; (2)
the installation of blow-out equipment designed to prevent the flow of
oil from a well in the event of an accident; and (3) the maintenance
of records of all drilling activities.68  Following the Santa Barbara di-
saster the technical regulations were also amended. 69 Particularly up-
graded were casing requirements, since it was the difference between
the casing requirements of California and the Federal Government which
triggered much of the criticism directed at the Department of the In-
terior following the Santa Barbara spill. 70
3. Deficiencies in the Federal System
a) Absence of a Realistic Inspection Program
Even with new legislation, the efforts of the United States Geologi-
cal Survey to prevent the occurrence of pollution may fail due to com-
placency in enforcing the administrative regulations. At present, petro-
leum companies merely certify to the Department of the Interior that the
operating standards required by the Geological Survey have been met
and that every effort is being made to avoid pollution accidents.7 Com-
pliance with the administrative guidelines of the Geological Survey,
therefore, is a voluntary effort.72 To a large extent, the Geological Sur-
67. 30 C.F.R. § 250.41 (1970).
68. The technical regulations are contained in Outer Continental Shelf Order
No. 10 (March 19, 1969).
69. 34 Fed. Reg. 13456 (1969). Continental Shelf Order No. 10, supra note
68, replaced Continental Shelf Order No. 2 which had previously set out technical op-
erating requirements, but it had not been revised since 1965.
70. See note 14 supra.
71. Executive Office of the President, Offshore Marine Resources: A Chal-
lenge and An Opportunity, supra note 10, at 9. Normally under USGS practice a well
is inspected only once during drilling procedure. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note
14 at 685 (statement of O.W. Solanos, Regional Supervisor, Oil & Gas Division, USGS).
72. The new regulations of the Department of the Interior on the subject of the
offshore petroleum driller's responsibility to the marine environment were heralded as
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vey is unable to correct the problem by instituting an inspection program
to determine whether petroleum companies are in compliance with its
guidelines because it does not have the trained technicians or the money
to supervise the manner in which drilling operations are carried out.
73
Thus, the approach of the USGS to the oil spill problem must be to
penalize offshore drillers who discharge oil into the ocean after the fact,
as no real effort can be made to prevent oil spill occurrences by en-
forcing strict compliance with minimum operating standards.
Despite the fact that the Department of the Interior cannot vigor-
ously enforce its administrative guidelines, the petroleum industry does
make an effort to follow the applicable regulations. A position state-
ment by the Western Oil and Gas Association provides:
Each operating company will design, construct and conduct opera-
tions in strict compliance with all local, State and Federal laws gov-
erning such activity, including pollution control.
Every operation will be programmed to prevent pollution ...
All employees will be indoctrinated and trained in the prevention of
pollution, legal requirements, surveillance and notification of au-
thorities and clean-up procedures. Special abatement instructions,
bulletins and personal consultations will be utilized to insure that
operations conform to this policy.7
4
Federal leasing, however, is based on a system of competitive bid-
ding, with the highest bidder receiving the right to drill in a particular
area. It is not in every oil company's best interest, therefore, to comply
with each technical regulation, or, going beyond this, to take every con-
ceivable precaution to prevent any possible occurrence of pollution due
to human error or equipment malfunctions. The failure of the volun-
tary compliance program in preventing oil spill occurrences is attested
to by the Geological Survey's discovery that the Chevron Oil Company
had failed to maintain 137 of its offshore wells in the Gulf of Mexico
in conformity with Department of the Interior regulations.7 5  In each
reflecting new concern for the prevention of pollution. Executive Office of the
President, Offshore Marine Resources: A Challenge and An Opportunity, 2ND REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON OIL SPILLS 9 (1969). No change was made, however, in
the voluntary compliance program which is at the heart of the department's adminis-
trative-guideline approach to preventing oil spill incidents.
73. At the time of the Santa Barbara Union Oil Company blow-out, there were
only four federal inspectors for drilling operations in the Pacific Coast region, and
there were only two persons in the Geological Survey capable of making inspections of
wells being drilled in the Santa Barbara Channel. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra
note 14, at 661-62.
74. Quoted in Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 332.
75. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1970, at 21, col. 1-4 quoted in 1-2 BNA ENV. REP.
Current Developments 35 (1970).
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case, storm chokes (designed to shut off the flow of oil in the well when
the pressure in the bore is less than that of the substratum through which
the well is being drilled) had been removed, apparently to get the maxi-
mum oil flow from the well and thus offset insufficient production
during adverse winter weather.76 An efficient federal inspection pro-
gram might have detected this violation prior to the fire and spill which
occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 1970.
b) Absence of Sanctions
Even when the Geological Survey finds violations of drilling or
pollution regulations, it has few sanctions at its command. Until the
passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,77 the only
federal statute dealing with oil pollution resulting from ocean petro-
leum production was contained in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. That act makes it a misdemeanor to willfully violate regulations
enacted by the Department of the Interior to conserve natural resources.7 8
No other federal water pollution statutes contain workable sanctions for
use against oil companies who ignore federal regulations designed to
prevent spills or who permit oil to be discharged into the oceans.79
Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,8" the first federal water
pollution act, has been construed to prohibit the discharge of oil into
navigable waters."' That act, however, refers only to vessels and shore-
based facilities and does not apply to offshore drilling facilities. The
Oil Pollution Act of 1924 made unlawful the grossly negligent or will-
ful discharge of oil into navigable waters, but it applied only to foreign
76. Chevron Oil Company was subsequently charged in a 900-count indictment
with failing to install and maintain safety storm chokes. Chevron pleaded guilty to the
first 500 counts; the other 400 counts were dropped on the motion of the government.
Chevron was fined $1 million on the 500 counts pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)
(1964), which makes it a misdemeanor to wilfully violate regulations enacted by the
Department of the Interior. 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current Developments 489 (1970).
The regional supervisor of the USGS for the Gulf of Mexico has reported other viola-
tions of USGS regulations by offshore operators conducting drilling operations in the
Gulf. Id.
77. 84 Stat. 91. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2) (1964).
79. The only legislation supported by the Department of the Interior officials
after the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill was the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, 84 Stat. 91 (now FWPCA §§ 11-16, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-66 (1970). See
note 59 & accompanying text supra.
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-65 (1964). The act is administered by the Army Corps
of Engineers.
81. United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952). See also
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
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and domestic vessels.32 The Oil Pollution Act of 1961 prohibits only
the discharge of oil from sea-going ships of American registry."' The
recent major federal legislation on the subject, the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act,84 principally provides financial and technical assist-
ance for the development of state water quality control programs. 85 Al-
though the Federal Government has been given jurisdiction under the
act to abate any pollution that occurs in coastal waters and endangers
the health or safety of any person,"8 the cumbersome abatement pro-
ceedings-requiring a conference, hearing, possible court action and
a minimum of one year of time-limit the effectiveness of poten-
tial future action under the act against offshore drilling operators who
are only occasional polluters.
87
The most useful sanctions available to the USGS against offending
offshore petroleum operators undoubtedly are contained in its own reg-
ulations. The regulations empower USGS regional supervisors to sus-
pend drilling operations, including production, which threaten aquatic
life or damage to the environment s or which are not in compliance with
applicable law and regulations. 89 These regulations vest the USGS
with authority to take immediate action against offshore drillers who fail
to comply with minimum operating standards before a spill has occurred
and without proof that the violations are willful.
The usefulness of these regulations, unfortunately, is limited by
the lack of inspectors available to the USGS to enable it to inspect drill-
ing operations with any regularity. Consequently, the Federal Govern-
ment's program to minimize the occurrence of oil spills is dependent
primarily upon the administrative enactments of the Department of
the Interior specifying that oil companies are to guard against oil spills
and establishing minimum production standards designed to prevent
oil pollution incidents. The guidelines are still "voluntarily enforced"
unless an offshore operator is occasionally found to have violated them
or causes a major oil spill.
82. 43 Stat. 604, repealed, Pub. L. 91-224, tit. I, § 108, 84 Stat. 113. The pro-
visions of the older act are now covered by FWPCA.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1001-15 (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1000-15 (Supp. IV,
1969). The act is administered by the Secretary of Transportation.
84. 33 U.S.C.A. H§ 1151-75 (1970). See note 59 supra.
85. Comment, Federal Programs for Water Pollution Control, 1 U.C. DAVIs
L. REV. 71, 83 (1969).
86. FWPCA H8 10(a), 23(e), 33 U.S.C.A. H§ 1160(a), 1173(e) (1970).
87. Comment, Federal Programs for Water Pollution Control, 1 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 71, 88-92 (1969).
88. 30 C.F.R. § 250.12(c) (1970).
89. Id. § 250.12(e) (1970).
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C. The Approach of the State of California
Basically, the efforts of California toward minimizing the incidence
of pollution from offshore drilling parallel those of the Federal Govern-
ment; reliance is placed on administrative regulations which inform off-
shore drilling operators of their responsibility not to pollute the marine
environment and which establish operating standards designed to mini-
mize the likelihood of well blow-outs. State regulatory officials, how-
ever, pursue a vigorous inspection program of offshore drilling opera-
tions and have a wider variety of sanctions available to enforce their
regulations.
1. Responsibilities and Technical Standards
In California, the leasing of submerged ocean lands is within the
jurisdiction of the State Lands Commission, which supervises the ex-
ploration and development of submerged resources within the control of
the state.90 Jurisdiction over the conservation of minerals and the liv-
ing resources of the state's submerged lands and the prevention of pollu-
tion of these resources is lodged in the Resources Agency. This agency
incorporates the State Water Resources Control Board, which exercises
jurisdiction over the quality of state waters, and the Fish and Game
Department, which is responsible for the protection of marine life and
the investigation and correction of pollution incidents endangering state
waters. 91
The State Lands Commission, in response to the request of the
California Legislature when it enacted the Public Resources Code,92
makes the following provision a part of every offshore oil lease that is
granted:
(b) Pollution and contamination of the ocean, and tidelands, or
navigable rivers or lakes, and all impairment of and interference
with bathing, fishing or navigation in the waters of the ocean or any
bay or inlet thereof, or any navigable river or lake, and all impair-
ment of, and interference with, developed shoreline recreational or
residential areas, is prohibited, and no oil, tar, residuary product of
oil or any refuse of any kind from any well or works shall be per-
mitted to be deposited on or pass into the waters of the ocean or any
bay or inlet thereof or any navigable river or lake; provided, how-
ever, that this subsection (b) shall not be deemed to apply to de-
90. 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, STUDY OF THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES § 12-A-6 (1969). The
California statutory scheme regulating the leasing of submerged state lands to offshore
petroleum drillers is set forth in CAL. PUB. RES. CODE tit. 2, §§ 1900-2604.
91. 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 12-A-6, T2-
A-14.
92. CAL. PUB. RES, CODE § 6873(b).
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posit on or passage into said waters of water not containing any
hydrocarbons or vegetable or animal matter.93
Like its federal counterparts, this provision attempts to define the re-
sponsibility of offshore drilling operators to avoid polluting the marine
environment.
Pursuant to its authority to issue rules and regulations dealing with
offshore petroleum production, 4 the State Lands Commission has en-
acted technical standards for offshore drillers which emphasize casing
requirements and other safety devices designed to prevent the occurrence
of well blow-outs. 95 The newly upgraded federal drilling standards
were patterned after these requirements.9 6  Finally, the State Lands
Commission requires offshore drillers, by the terms of the state sub-
merged lands lease agreement, to indemnify the state for all losses aris-
ing out of offshore drilling operations; 7 this would appear to include
losses from the costs of cleaning up an oil spill and damages to the marine
environment.
2. Sanctions Available to State Regulatory Agencies
While primary responsibility in California for the prevention of
ocean pollution by the petroleum industry rests with the State Lands
Commission, other California regulatory agencies also have authority
to act in this area. This creates some overlap among state regulatory
agencies, but it also gives state officials a wide variety of sanctions
against offshore drilling operators whose activities result in oil spills.
The State Department of Fish and Game has explicit authority to
take action against those who willfully, negligently or accidentally
pollute state waters. The Fish and Game Code provides:
It is unlawful to deposit in, permit to pass into, or place where it can
flow into the waters of this State any of the following:
(a) Any petroleum, acid, coal or oil tar, lampblack, aniline,
asphalt, bitumen, or residuary product of petroleum, or carbo-
naceous material or substance. 98
93. Id. § 6873(b), as amended, Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1427, at 2926. The
amendment added a new sentence which is italicized in the text.
94. CAL. PuB. Ran. CODE § 6873(d).
95. See CAL. AD. CODE, tit. 2, §§ 2100-22.
96. See note 67 & accompanying text supra.
97. State Lands Commission, Oil and Gas Lease § 13, in 2 PuBLic LAND
LAw RaviEw COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 12-A-139.
98. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5650. This section is particularly useful against
occasional polluters-such as offshore drilling operators-as opposed to chronic pol-
luters who are covered by the 1969 Water Quality Control Act. See text accompanying
notes 102-109 infra.
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Both civil and criminal penalties may be imposed for a violation of this
section. 9 In addition, section 5655 of the Fish and Game Code, as
recently enacted, provides that the Department of Fish and Game may
clean up any petroleum product deposited in state waters and recover
any costs incurred as a result of such cleanup activity. °00 Finally, offi-
cials of the Fish and Game Department may recover damages against
any person who willfully or negligently causes the destruction of any
bird, mammal or fish protected by the laws of the state.' 0 '
Under recently enacted legislation, 102 the State Water Resources
Control Board may have authority to take action against offshore oil
drillers who discharge oil into California coastal waters. The Water
Quality Control Act vests jurisdiction over the quality of state waters in
the State Water Resources Control Board and delegates responsibility
to nine other regional boards to formulate water quality plans for spe-
cific state areas.' 0 These general plans are implemented when the re-
gional boards work out discharge requirements for individual dischargers
of polluting material.' 04 Any person who discharges pollutants in vio-
lation of applicable requirements set forth in the plan is made strictly
liable for the removal of the pollutants; where no discharge requirements
99. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12004, which provides for a maximum fine of
$1000 and a maximum of 1 year in jail. Section 151 of the California Harbor and
Navigation Code, as amended in 1968, provides for an additional civil penalty (of up
to $6000) specifically in the event of an intentional or negligent discharge of oil into
state waters. The amendment to section 151 provided: "It is the intention of the
Legislature hereby to correct and to eliminate the major pollution threat to the
state's harbors and waterways by deposits and spillages of oil by those persons who are
either manufacturing, drilling, . . or using oil in greater than minimal quantities."
Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1259, § 3, at 2377. The legislative history note to this amend-
ment indicates that the legislature may have intended to impose liability on offshore
drillers only in the event of an intentional or negligent discharge and thus to modify
the absolute liability features of section 5650 of the Fish and Game Code which im-
poses a penalty in the event of any prohibited discharge. The Water Code, at
section 13304, contains a provision similar to that set forth in section 151 of the Har-
bor and Navigation Code; it has been judicially determined that the Water Code
section supplements but does not supplant section 5650 of the Fish and Game Code.
People v. Union Oil Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 566, 74 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1968).
100. WEST'S CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, No. 7 (1970). Cf. CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE § 12015; CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 151. Section 151 imposes liability
for the costs of cleaning up an oil spill only in the event of an intentional or negli-
gent discharge.
101. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2014.
102. The basic legislation is the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act
which revises division 7 of the California Water Code. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-
908. An extensive analysis of the act is in Robie, Water Pollution: An Affirmative
Response by the California Legislature, 1 PAc. L. Rav. 2 (1970).
103. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13140, 13240, 13245.
104. Id. § 13263(a).
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are in effect, a person is required to clean up pollutants only when he
has intentionally or negligently created a condition of pollution.10 5
Since offshore oil production involves occasional rather than chronic
discharges of oil, this provision of the Water Quality Control Act would
normally apply only to oil spills resulting from intentional or negligent
acts;10 thus, it does not add remedies different from those provided un
der section 151 of the Harbor and Navigation Code.0 7 If, however, a
regional board with jurisdiction over an area where offshore drilling is
conducted acts pursuant to section 13243 of the Water Code' to pro-
hibit the discharge of any oil into California coastal vvaters, the abso-
lute liability features of the act on the subject of removal of the pollutant
would come into play. 0 9
If a regional board adopts a plan which prohibits the discharge of
any oil into coastal waters, offshore drillers would be fully liable for the
costs of cleaning up the oil spill, even if the spill resulted from an acci-
dental discharge. Such action would also give a regional board with
jurisdiction over coastal waters in which offshore drilling is occurring
other enforcement powers."l0  State officials would like to apply the
applicable provisions of this act to offshore drillers operating in federal
waters as well as those operating in state waters. Since several of its
features conflict with the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, how-
ever, it is doubtful that the act can be applied against offshore drillers
operating in federal waters pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act."'
105. Id. § 13050(1) which defines "pollution."
106. Id. § 13304(a).
107. See note 99 supra.
108. Section 13243 sets forth the requirements of a program to achieve water
quality objectives.
109. State waters include ocean waters for a distance of 3 nautical miles from the
mean lower low water mark on the California coast. CAL. WATER CODE § 13200(i).
Mr. Ronald Robie, a member of the State Water Resources Control Board, in a private
conversation, indicated that such action is being considered by the regional water qual-
ity board with jurisdiction over state waters in the Santa Barbara Channel.
110. CAL. WATER CODE § 13301 gives a regional board authority to issue cease
and desist orders to prohibit the discharge of further pollutants.
111. State laws are applicable in Outer Continental Shelf areas under the control
of the Federal Government only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with
federal laws. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a) (1)-(2) (1964). See note 35 supra. The question
of whether the State of California has authority to take action against federal lessees
who are responsible for oil spills which affect California offshore waters or the Cal-
ifornia coastline is still an open one. Following the Santa Barbara Union Oil Com-
pany spill in 1969, the District Attorney of Santa Barbara served nuisance abatement
notices, in accordance with California Penal Code section 373(a) (Public Nuisance)
on several oil companies operating in the Santa Barbara Channel. The notices served
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3. The California Inspection Program
Despite the variety of legal tools available to state regulatory of-
ficials concerned with pollution resulting from offshore petroleum pro-
duction, the most important aspect of the state program to minimize oil
spill occurrences is the vigorous program of inspection conducted by the
State Lands Commission. The commission inspects wells on a 7-days-
a-week basis to insure that drilling operators are in compliance with
state drilling requirements."' California has about 50 petroleum geolo-
gists inspecting offshore drilling operations; these inspectors make or
witness tests of blow-out prevention equipment and check for compli-
ance with the casing requirements on all wells drilled on state sub-
merged lands."' Any operator who refuses to permit inspection of his
well or who violates or refuses to comply with any operating regulations
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 4  Offshore drillers are also required to
suspend any drilling and production operations, except those which are
corrective, protective or mitigative, in the event of pollution caused by
drilling operations."'
D. The Prevention of Pollution: The Need
for New Legislative Action
The Federal Government's approach to preventing oil spills has
been considerably less successful than that of the State of California. As
on Union Oil Company and Texaco, Inc. described the nuisance as "the flowing of oil
and gas." Notices served on Phillips Petroleum Company and Humble Oil and Re-
fining Company described the nuisances as "drilling for oil or gas" or "preparation"
for such drilling. Preliminary injunctions against the efforts of the district attorney
were sought in federal court by the oil companies. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, orders granting the preliminary injunctions were affirmed. The
court ruled that the United States has the power to develop the Outer Continental
Shelf through the use of private leases, that the Santa Barbara District Attorney was
engaged in a comprehensive plan designed to frustrate a federal power and that the
threatened nuisance prosecutions were properly entered pending the termination of
litigation. The court did not pass on the existence of a power in California to punish
those who, on the Outer Continental Shelf, do acts which have an effect on the Cal-
ifornia shoreline. Union Oil Company of California v. Minier, -F.2d - Civ. Nos.
25,045, 25,046, 25,047, 25,048 (9th Cir., Dec. 3, 1970).
112. Flood Control Hearings, supra note 14, at 158.
113. See Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 609 (testimony of James G.
Stearns, Director, California Dep't of Conservation); Everitts & Mathews, Report of a
Study on California State Regulations and Inspection Practices of Oil and Gas Op-
erations and Oil Pollution, in SECOND ANNUAL OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE
(1970).
114. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 3236. Drilling from offshore locations is required
to be conducted in compliance with rules and regulations in effect when a lease is is-
sued. Id. § 6873(d).
115. CAL. AD. CODE, tit. 2, § 2121 (June 6, 1956).
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of January 31, 1969, 7,642 oil and gas wells had been drilled in sub-
merged lands under the control of the Federal Government; during the
period 1953-1968, 13 significant oil spill incidents from these wells had
been reported. 16 While there were only about 925 oil wells in off-
shore waters under the control of the State of California by 1969,117 no
major oil spills during the period 1900-1968 had ever been reported."
8
While these figures are hardly conclusive, they suggest that before ma-
jor leasing of submerged lands in the Outer Continental Shelf areas is
initiated by the Federal Government,"' the Department of the In-
terior must improve its program to prevent the occurrence of oil spill
incidents.
The passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 and the
enactment of new minimum technical drilling requirements by the De-
partment of the Interior has greatly conformed the approach of the Fed-
eral Government to that of California. Both rely heavily on a "regu-
lations and sanctions" approach to encourage offshore petroleum oper-
ators to avoid oil spills resulting from human error or equipment failure.
Regulatory agencies of each government have enacted regulations de-
signed to impress upon offshore drilling operators their responsibilities
to avoid marine pollution as well as regulations requiring the use of
safety equipment designed to minimize the probability of well blow-outs.
Officials of these agencies have various sanctions available to them for
use against offshore drillers who do not comply with these regulations.
In each case, the differences between federal and state regulations and
statutes are differences in degree, not differences of approach.
There is still an important point of departure between the two ap-
proaches, however. As noted, California has a vigorous program of
inspection of offshore drilling operations while the Federal Government,
at present, does not. The number of violations of Department of the In-
terior regulations occurring on Chevron Oil Company drilling opera-
tions in the Gulf of Mexico'20 indicates that offshore operators may be
unwilling to adhere voluntarily to regulations designed to reduce the
116. Hearings on HR. 4148 Before the House Comm. on Public Works, supra
note 66, at 361-62 (letter to committee chairman from Russell E. Train, Undersecretary
of the Interior).
117. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 481.
118. Everitts & Mathews, supra note 113.
119. There are over 1 million square miles in the Outer Continental Shelf under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Government; at present, only 1 percent of this land has
been leased for offshore petroleum production. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note
14, at 961 (testimony'of Dr. W. T. Pecora, Director of USGS).
120. See notes 75-6 & accompanying text supra.
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hazard of oil pollution incidents. This may be especially true when the
economic costs of abiding by the regulations are high and the costs of
sanctions for their violations are not. In such a case, economic con-
siderations dictate that profits can be best increased by avoiding drilling
regulations imposed by the federal or state governments.
A continuous program of preventative surveillance and inspec-
tion of drilling operations designed to determine and eliminate the
sources of intentional, negligent and accidental pollution dangers has
undoubtedly contributed to the success of California's program. The
United States Geological Survey should follow California's lead by
abandoning its voluntary-compliance program and initiating a program
of preventative inspection similar to that conducted in California.
When violations of minimum operating standards are detected, pro-
duction operations should be suspended until operators are determined
to be in full compliance with applicable regulations. This, of course,
will necessitate providing the USGS with sufficient funds to employ
trained inspectors. Furthermore, Congress should enact new sanc-
tions imposing strict civil penalties for violations of drilling regulations
and should eliminate the limitation on liability for the costs of removing
accidental discharges of oil. Such sanctions would encourage the petro-
leum industry to internalize the costs of pollution prevention rather than
meeting the costs after pollution has occurred.
An even more effective pollution prevention program-relying on
the regulations and sanctions approach already favored both by Cali-
fornia and the Federal Government-would result if the regulation of
all offshore petroleum production in the Outer Continental Shelf area
in the Pacific Ocean were entrusted to the State of California. 121 Con-
solidating the administrative agencies would end the confusion and un-
certainty created by the current dual regulation system. It would also
vest the regulation of offshore drilling operations in the governmental
body with the most to lose from the pollution of marine resources in
the Pacific Ocean and with the most success in devising programs to
minimize the incidence of pollution from offshore drilling.
IV. Subsurface Geological Conditions
A. The Problem
While most blow-outs of offshore oil wells are attributable to hu-
man error, failure of safety equipment or non-compliance with safety
121. California attempted to make available its manpower resources and ex-
pertise in the area of inspection of offshore drilling operations to the Federal Govern-
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regulations, well blow-outs may also occur because of variations in the
geologic substratum of submerged lands in which drilling operations
are conducted. These variations make each well drilled different from
any other and when unusual subsurface geologic conditions are en-
countered, minimum safety regulations are unable to effectively per-
form their intended function.
122
Theoretically, variations in submerged lands through which a well
is drilled ought to necessitate variations in the minimum safety require-
ments designed to reduce the probability of oil spills.' 23 Since well
blow-outs occur when pressures in the well bore are less than pressures
outside the bore, an important aspect of preventing blow-outs is the
ability to contain any pressures that may occur during the drilling of a
well. To correctly design well casings or other safety devices, the
geologic conditions in which wells are drilled must be understood.
12 4
B. Current Approaches to the Problem
Regulatory agencies concerned with the prevention of hydrocar-
bon oil discharges from offshore drilling operations need complete and
accurate information to determine whether to waive safety-equipment
requirements designed to prevent pollution or to impose more stringent
safety requirements. Despite this fact, the United States Geological
Survey and the California State Lands Commission make few inde-
pendent analyses of geological conditions in proposed drilling areas.
125
ment when submerged lands under the control of the Federal Government were first
leased. Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 610-15. The offer, which was
refused, has been frequently repeated by the State of California.
122. Professor Curry, Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences at
the University of California, has speculated as follows: "[11f all Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) leases off Santa Barbara County are eventually occupied and some produc-
tion is achieved from the deeper potential producing horizons, Santa Barbara offshore
exploration and production could yield a higher frequency of spills related to flow-
outs than in the gulf coast because of Santa Barbara's deeper water, greater density
of faults and fissures, greater tectonic activity, and paucity of subsurface geologic
knowledge." Hearings on S. 7 & S. 544, supra note 14, at 636.
123. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.12(b) (1970).
124. Another potential pollution threat to the marine environment is the release of
oil from offshore wells during seismic disturbance. All of the Pacific Coast is seis-
mically alive, and fault activity on some large Santa Barbara Channel faults is sub-
stantially greater than on the mainland anywhere else in Santa Barbara. CAL.
DEP'T OF WATER RESoURcEs BuLL. No. 116-2, CRUSTAL STRAIN AND FAULT MOVEMENT
INVESTIGATION, map (1964). Effective oil pollution prevention legislation must include
the requirement of safety devices to close off oil wells ruptured by seismic disturbances.
125. The problem is fully documented in Harlow, The Oil Men and the Sea: The
Future of Ocean Resource Development in Light of Santa Barbara-Some proposals to
Rectify Continuing Inadequate Federal Regulation of Offshore Leasing, 11 AIZ. L.
REV. 677, 712-18 (1969).
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They must rely, therefore, on the information furnished by the petroleum
industry in making their decisions on required safety and blow-out pre-
vention equipment. 126  For example, most geologic studies of the sub-
merged land areas where offshore drilling may be conducted are per-
formed exclusively on the initiative of the petroleum industry;127 geologi-
cal and geophysical explorations were carried out in the Santa Barbara
Channel by petroleum companies for 10 years before federal leases
were granted.'
28
Both California 29 and the Federal Government3  have regula-
tions requiring offshore drilling operators who have made geologic sur-
veys to release this information to appropriate government officials.
In the event that unusual geological conditions are encountered, fed-
eral supervising officials are expected to modify drilling requirements
in order to minimize the danger of a well blow-out. 3 ' It appears, how-
ever, that the USGS rarely receives this needed information and that it is
useless when received.
Because lease sales are competitive, information and data on the
geologic nature of possible oil-bearing formations are held proprie-
tary by industry and are not usually available to government until
their use is of no further value in an economic sense.132
126. E.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.34 (1970) which provides that prior to the beginning
of any drilling operations on a lease, the lessee shall submit to the supervisor for ap-
proval acceptable plans for the performance of such work. Such plans shall include
(1) a plan of the drilling platform or structures; (2) the blowout prevention, mud,
casing, and cementing program for the well; (3) structural interpretations based on
all available geological and geophysical data; (4) other pertinent data as the USGS
supervisor may prescribe. See also 30 C.F.R. § 250.38 (1970).
127. Harlow, supra note 125, at 712. Requirements for the issuance of geologic
survey permits set forth by the State of California are in CALs. AD. CODE, tit. 2,
§ 2100.
128. Executive Office of the President, The Oil Spill Problem, lsT REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON OIL SPILLS 22 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Oil Spill Prob-
lem].
129. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6826.
130. 30 C.F.R. § 250.34 (1970).
131. 30 C.F.R. H9 250.12(a)-(b) (1970). In the case of the Union Oil well which
blew out in the Santa Barbara Channel, there had been a waiver of the minimum casing
requirements by the Geological Survey; Secretary of the Interior Hickel conceded that
the waiver should not have been granted, but Dr. R.G. Wayland of USGS denied that
it was the cause of the oil spill. Hearings on H.R. 4148 Before the Committee on Public
Works, supra note 66 at 355-56.
132. The Oil Spill Problem, supra note 128, at 22. This conclusion is reinforced
by statements made by Department of the Interior officials following the Santa Barbara
oil spill. Secretary Hickel stated: "It has become increasingly clear that there is a lack
of sufficient [geologic] knowledge of this particular area. This lack leaves us no other
reasonable course of action than to halt drilling until Union's ruptured well can be
sealed and until the required geological knowledge can be secured." Quoted in Flood
Control Hearings, supra note 14, at 77 (original source not furnished). Former Secre-
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It is clear that the agencies concerned with the regulation of off-
shore petroleum production should begin gathering geologic data on
submerged land conditions on their own initiative. Such data would
enable the administrative agencies to make competent judgments as to
the drilling requirements to be imposed on each well. No further
drilling should be permitted until this is done. Furthermore, those
agencies concerned with oil pollution prevention should determine
what safety equipment is needed to prevent the occurrence of pollution
under all foreseeable circumstances, and leases should only be granted
to those petroleum companies who demonstrate their ability and willing-
ness to install the requisite safety and blow-out prevention equipment
on each well put down.
V. The Multiple-Use Concept of California Ocean Areas
A. The Problem
Where the lack of specific information about geologic conditions
is great, and where ocean areas contain resources other than petroleum
that are of vital importance to society, offshore drilling either should be
subject to the most stringent regulations possible or forbidden alto-
gether.
From the point of view of geologic structure and oil-well tech-
nology, there are few (if any) coastal oil fields that are especially
more hazardous than others at the well-sites. Nevertheless oil
fields differ in their problems and requirements. The vertical
sequence of rocks and their characteristics and structural conditions
of the continental shelves of North America are known only by in-
ference and extrapolation before drilling. These uncertainties,
which should control drilling practices, will not permit intelligent
predrfilling evaluation of specific areas or structures with regard to
the special problems they represent. However, because of vari-
able oceanographic characteristics and differing beneficial uses of
the ocean, the potential consequences of environmental degradation
in case of well leakage are highly variable. Therefore, some situa-
tions require much higher standards of operation and supervision
than others in order to preserve the environmental qualities at
desired levels.'1
3
An inventory of the marine environment off the coast of California
tary of the Interior Udall stated that one of the lessons of the Santa Barbara disaster was
the need for more funds "for the Geological Survey to carry out studies of its own
rather than depend upon oil companies for data about submerged land formations
and possible damage to natural resources." N.Y. Times, March 11, 1969, at 31, col. 4.
133. The Oil Spill Problem, supra note 128, at 22.
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may indicate certain areas that have such unique social value that any
pollution which occurs will involve intolerable danger to these resources.
The Report of the Panel on Marine Resources, noting that there is an
increasing trend toward marine-oriented recreation, has stated:
If marine recreation, in all its forms and ramifications, can be called
an industry it presently ranks at least a close second to the offshore
oil and gas industry in economic importance. It may, in fact, actu-
ally outrank oil and gas, but statistics are inadequate to segregate
recreational expenditures in the marine environment from those on
land.' 3
4
The Pacific coastal waters are also rich in pelagic wetfishes such
as anchovy, jack mackerel and hake; in 1964 and 1965, United States
commercial fishermen took $50 million per year of fish from the Pacific
Ocean waters off the coast of California. 13  As these figures indicate,
there is every indication that recreational and wildlife resources are as
important to society as petroleum and that the importance of each of
these marine resources will continue to increase. Ocean areas where
recreation and wildlife resources are located must be identified and
protected from industrial pollution so that as the increasing population
magnifies the importance of these resources, they will be available free
from hydrocarbon oil contamination.
B. Current Approaches to the Problem
California law presently prohibits offshore petroleum drilling in
certain identified areas, including the coastal areas of Santa Barbara and
San Luis Obispo Counties and around the San Clemente and Santa Cata-
lina Islands. 3 6 After the Santa Barbara oil spill, the Federal Govern-
ment made permanent a previously temporary withdrawal of offshore
drilling areas in the Santa Barbara Channel and added additional areas
adjacent to this ecological preserve, thereby enlarging the buffer zone.' 37
The California Public Resources Code contains a unique provision
which affords any city or county that would be affected by offshore
drilling if a lease were granted the right to a hearing and an opportunity
134. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING & RESOURCES, supra note 5,
at VII-236.
135. Id.
136. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 6871.1-.2.
137. Public Land Law Order No. 4587, 34 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Mar. 21, 1969). For
an explanation of this order, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1969, at 18, col. 3. President
Nixon has proposed legislation which would eliminate some more production operations
in the Santa Barbara Channel (20 non-producing wells). S. 4017, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). Senator Cranston (Dem., California) has proposed a bill to eliminate all
offshore oil production activities in the channel. S. 1219, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6870, printed in WEST'S CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
SERVICE ch. 1530, at 3104 (1970).
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to present evidence as to why the proposed lease should not be issued.
1 38
The interested city or county may present evidence at the hearing as to
whether the proposed lease would:
(a) Be detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, conve-
nience, or welfare of persons residing in, owning real property, or
working in the neighborhood of such areas;
(b) Interfere with the developed riverbank or shoreline, resi-
dential or recreational areas to an extent that would render such
areas unfit for recreational or residential uses or unfit for park pur-
poses;
(q) Destroy, impair, or interfere with the esthetic and scenic
value of such recreational, residential or park areas;
(d) Create any fire hazard or hazards, or smoke, smog or
dust nuisance or pollution of waters surrounding or adjoining said
areas. 139
The California State Lands Division also advises the Department of Fish
and Game of all proposed offshore leases and solicits the comments of
that department. The department has no authority to prevent leasing
or to impose restrictions but has suggested modifications of some leases
to protect the ecology and aesthetics of lease areas. 140
The Federal Government has no procedure to afford an oppor-
tunity for public comment on whether offshore oil leases should be
granted in areas proposed for drilling. Newly-enacted regulations of
the Department of the Interior provide that prior to the selection of tracts
for leasing, the department must evaluate the potential effect of leasing
on the total environment; to aid in this evaluation public hearings may
be held.' 4 ' The language of this section is directory and not manda-
tory.' 42 Further, recent federal courts of appeals decisions have turned
down injunction suits based on arguments that federal agencies must
grant public hearings before authorizing the drilling of new offshore
wells.' 43 The new regulation described above, however, may furnish
a basis for private action in administrative proceedings to force the
Bureau of Land Management to take all environmental factors into con-
sideration in selecting tract areas for leasing; this would not extend,
however, to the drilling of new wells at particular locations already un-
der lease.144
138. CAL. PuB. Rls. CODE § 6873.2.
139. Id.
140. 2 Public Land Law Review Commission, supra note 90, at 12-A-15.
141. 43 C.F.R. § 3381.4 (1970).
142. County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164, 169-70 (9th Cir. 1970).
143. County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970); County
of Santa Barbara v. Malley, 426 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1970).
144. This distinction was noted by the court in County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel,
426 F.2d 164, 169 (9th Cir. 1970).
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C. The Need for New Action
While the State of California has begun weighing the ecological
importance of an area with the potential benefits of permitting the ex-
ploitation of natural resources, there are still several deficiencies in its
approach to the problem. In determining whether certain areas are to
be protected from drilling operations, the state places considerable em-
phasis on aesthetic considerations; factors such as the conservation of
other marine resources-fish, wildlife, water-have been largely ig-
nored. Thus, leases may be granted without full consideration of all
aspects that should be determinative of whether development of petro-
leum resources in coastal areas proposed for leasing is advantageous
to society. Moreover, since only cities and counties have standing to
require a hearing,'" not all interested persons may be furnished an op-
portunity to present evidence on the question of whether offshore drill-
ing should be allowed. Oil companies have competent public rela-
tions agencies capable of presenting persuasive arguments for the
need to permit drilling in any given area. Any hearing designed to in-
vestigate the wisdom of allowing drilling in a particular area will become
an exercise in administrative futility unless parties opposed to leasing
are as competently represented as the petroleum companies. This
means that interested private individuals and conservation organizations
must be given the right to request hearings and to present evidence on
the merits of offshore drilling in proposed lease areas.
146
The Federal Government should follow the lead of California and
require mandatory public hearings prior to permitting offshore drilling in
any particular offshore ocean area; the hearings should be open to all in-
terested persons. Both state and federal regulatory agencies must recog-
nize that only through open hearings can the public express its interest in
preserving particular ocean areas free from development. In addition,
these hearings can furnish information to the regulatory agencies on the
need for the enactment of special operating regulations to protect re-
gional resources considered vital by the public.
Finally, those areas that are now defined as sanctuaries from drill-
ing should be put into escrow for a specified number of years and be
protected from reclassification whenever there is a change in personnel
administering offshore petroleum development in the Pacific Ocean.
The conservation of marine resources is sufficiently important to tran-
145. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6873.2.
146. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13052.2 which requires a regional water
quality control board to hold public hearings before adopting a water quality control
plan in a specific area of California.
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scend the political and economic vagaries of those who have legislative
and administrative power at any given time. Holding these sanctuaries
in escrow will provide the time necessary for extensive investigation into
the effects of hydrocarbon oil pollution on the marine environment and
will prevent the recurrence of spills in these already-damaged areas.
VI. Private Litigation
The Federal Government and the State of California have delegated
full responsibility for the prevention of oil pollution to regulatory agen-
cies. Administrative regulation in this area has thus virtually pre-
empted the use of judicial regulation to prevent oil pollution. Adminis-
trative officials'have so many legislatively conferred tools for controlling
oil pollution that statutory and common-law remedies of public nuisance
and trespass have not been widely used to compel the petroleum industry
to guard against pollution incidents through the imposition of large civil
judgments.14 7 The courts, however, at least in theory, constitute the
sole branch of government easily accessible to private citizens con-
cerned with abuses of the marine environment by pollution from off-
shore drilling.
148
Historically, the courts have been open to plaintiffs whose property
or person has been damaged by those who devote adjoining property
to industrial use.' 49 Judges, however, have not always been responsive
to individual grievances against corporate defendants; this is especially
true when judges see their role as protecting the development of in-
dustry which will benefit society as a whole, rather than protecting the
rights of individuals harmed by industrial growth. 50 While this view is
147. A general description of tort claims against water polluters based on trespass
and public and private nuisance actions is in Note, Private Remedies for Water
Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970).
148. 'The courts provide an arena in which industry lobbyists and indifferent
bureaucrats are at least able to exercise their powers of dead-center inertia, and con-
sequently the judicial approach may be a viable route to relatively immediate and
surprisingly large-scale pollution abatement." Esposito, Air and Water Pollution:
What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CiV. LIBERTrES L.
REv. 32, 33 (1970).
149. See, e.g., Foster v. Warblington Urban Dist. Council, [1906] 1 K.B. 648,
affirming 69 J.P. 42 (1905), where damages were allowed for private oyster beds
destroyed by sewage discharged into the sea by defendant corporation.
150. See, e.g., Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918),
aff'd, 249 U.S. 540 (1919), denying a damage action for injuries to private oyster beds
by sewage discharge. "[Tihe oyster planter takes his right to plant and propagate
oysters on the public domain of the commonwealth in the tidal waters, subject to
the ancient right of the riparian owners to drain the harmful refuse of the land into the
sea, which is the sewer provided therefor by nature. . . ." Id. at 19, 96 S.E. at
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pervasive,' 5 ' there appears to be growing recognition in judicial opin-
ions of the need to protect the environment." 2 At present, however,
private suits are unlikely to have much impact on the oil spill problem.
Suits brought after the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill, intended to
make offshore petroleum operators and the Federal Government more
responsive to the need to protect the marine environment, have been
singularly unsuccessful.
153
At common law, damage to another's property gave rise to a cause
of action for the damages without proof of fault under the ancient writ
of trespass quare clausum fregit.5 4 While some courts still permit
those damaged by ocean pollution to recover under this old writ,155 the
modem law of torts infrequently imposes liability in the absence of
proof of fault.' 56
The principal remedy for damages to property resulting from oil
drilling on land is an action for negligence rather than for absolute lia-
bility.15 7  This is because most actions for damages resulting from oil
309. See also McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 183 A.2d 581 (Del. 1962), denying an action
by local residents to enjoin the building of an oil refinery in the area on the
ground that mere destruction of the aesthetic qualities of the area is not sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief. Before injunctive relief can be granted, the proposed use
must be shown to be a nuisance per se. Oil refineries are not in that category of uses;
neither is oil well drilling. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270
P. 952 (1928).
151. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
152. This trend is particularly reflected in the new "standing" suits. E.g., Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970). But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civ. No. 24,966 (9th Cir., Sept. 16, 1970).
153. E.g., County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970);
County of Santa Barbara v. Malley, 426 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1970); Union Oil Co. v.
Minier, - F.2d - Civ. Nos. 25,045, 25,046, 25,047, 25,048 (9th Cir., Dec. 3, 1970).
154. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (3d ed. 1964).
155. E.g., Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 267 F. 460 (D.R.I. 1920).
156. Especially dangerous or ultrahazardous activities involve strict or absolute
liability, allowing a claimant to recover without proof of negligence simply by showing
damage and that the damage resulted from the ultrahazardous activity. An activity is
ultrahazardous if it necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to another which cannot
be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care and if it is not a matter of common
usage. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1928). A timeless example is the keeping of
wild and dangerous animals.
Dean Prosser summarizes the rationale for the imposition of absolute liability as
follows: "The problem is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss
to be charged against a complex and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed
upon the party best able to shoulder it." W. PROSSER, supra note 154, at 509.
157. E.g., Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 190 Okla. 344, 124 P.2d 255 (1942);
Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Aired, 182 Okla. 400, 77 P.2d 1155 (1938); Tidal Oil Co. v.
Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931); Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815
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drilling have arisen in states where oil production is a major factor in
the state's economy, and courts in these states have been unwilling to
impose liability on petroleum companies in the absence of proof of un-
reasonable care in drilling operations. 158  Some courts, in states where
oil production is less common and less important to the states' economies,
have held oil drilling to be an ultrahazardous activity; these courts im-
pose absolute liability standards on drillers for the damage their drilling
has caused regardless of the care that has been exercised in the drilling
operations. 150 California is among the latter states, although there has
been only one decision to date.' 60
For a brief time following the Santa Barbara Channel disaster,
federal regulations made federal lessees absolutely liable for damages
from oil spills to private persons.'"' Under the current regulation, how-
ever, the lessee is absolutely liable only for the costs of removing oil
pollutants resulting from drilling operations;0 2 the lessee's liability to
third parties, other than for removal of the pollutant, is governed by ap-
plicable law.'" 3 In the case of oil spilled off the coast of California, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act' 64 would require application of Cali-
fornia law.'6 5 Thus, at least in California coastal waters, federal lessees
may still be liable for pollution damage under absolute liability prin-
ciples.
The disparity between states which impose negligence liability and
those which impose absolute liability on oil drilling operations on land
will probably continue as suits for pollution from offshore drilling are
initiated. The difference between these two standards of liability for
those suing offshore drillers for pollution damages is enormous. To re-
cover on the grounds of negligence, the plaintiff must bear the bur-
den of proof on the issue of negligence in the operation of the drill-
ing; under the absolute liability standard, all the plaintiff must prove is
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931). An extensive work on the subject of inland pollution by oil
companies is Knodell, Liability for Pollution of Surface and Underground Waters, 12
RocKy MT. MwERAs L. INST. 33 (1967).
158. See, e.g., Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
159. E.g., Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934); Helms v.
Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 P. 208 (1917); Niagra Oil Co. v. Jackson,
48 Ind. App. 238, 91 N.E. 825 (1910).
160. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928). See
Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CN. L. REv.
587, 645-55 (1969).
161. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
162. 34 Fed. Reg. 2503 (1969). See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
163. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250143(b)-(e) (1970). See text accompanying note 56 supra.
164. 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964)).
165. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1964).
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damage caused by oil discharged from the defendant's offshore drilling
operations. The difficulty of proving negligence in the operation of
offshore drilling and the difficulty of showing a causal connection be-
tween negligence in drilling operations and an oil spill imposes an ex-
tremely heavy burden on the plaintiff. 1 6 Thus, relief in those jurisdic-
tions requiring proof of negligence may be foreclosed.
The paucity of recoveries even in those jurisdictions imposing ab-
solute liability on oil drillers attests in part to the difficulty of proving
compensable damages resulting from pollution. Damages in absolute
liability cases are judicially limited because the imposition of liability
for all damages creates too great an economic burden on those who
engage in ultrahazardous activities. The necessity for restricting lia-
bility in these cases demands that some limits on recovery be set; in gen-
eral, absolute liability has been confined to those consequences which
clearly lie within the risk of the hazardous activity undertaken. 16 7
At the outset, it can certainly be stated that the most obvious kind
of pollution damage from offshore drilling is damage from oil to real
and personal property adjoining the drilling area. Thus, owners of
beachfront property may recover for pollution damage to their prop-
erty caused by oil and tar on beaches, boats and houses and for the loss
of the use of beach property for recreational purposes.16 8  Likewise, the
owner of a beachfront resort should be able to recover for damage re-
sulting from the loss of vacationers since the loss of guests is a conse-
quence of the property damage. Those hotel owners who do not own
beachfront property, however, but live in coastal areas where pollution
has occurred and to which guests do not come, will probably not be
able to recover for the loss of guests.' 69 Extending liability to inland
hotel owners gives rise to the possibility of speculative claims that will
probably be discouraged because of the economic burden it would im-
pose on offshore drilling operators.
Fishermen should be able to recover for the loss of their prospective
166. See, e.g., Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955),
criticized in Green, Hazardous Oil and Gas Operations: Tort Liability, 33 TEx. L. REV.
574 (1955); Trosclair v. Superior Oil Co., 219 So. 2d 278 (La. 1969); Continental Oil
Co. v. Hinton, 253 Miss. 233, 175 So. 2d 512 (1965).
167. W. PROSSER, supra note 154, at 533.
168. E.g., Petition of N.J. Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
where damages were awarded for loss of use of beach property because of oil pollu-
tion; the property had been used for swimming and sunbathing.
169. See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAm L. REv. 155, 174
(1969). The loss of guests by inland hotel owners (for an indeterminate distance
from the coast) is not a consequence that is clearly in the risk of damage resulting
from oil discharged from offshore drilling operations.
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catches by pollution from offshore drilling, but this question is very
much an open one. 170  If recovery for the loss of prospective catches
of fish is allowed, the next question is whether liability should be ex-
tended beyond the initial year of loss if catches are reduced for several
years.
Obviously, those persons who do not suffer property damage or
pecuniary loss have few direct damages for which they can recover un-
der any theory of liability. Those who are injured aesthetically because
the degradation of their environment makes coastal areas less pleasant
to live in will find no relief in the courts.171 Those whose physical or
mental well-being is affected by oil pollution may be able to find some
basis for tort relief for a tort of damage to health from pollution in the
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act. 172 The act
provides in part that Congress recognizes that each person should en-
joy a healthful environment.173  When pollution affects the physical
health or emotional happiness of those who live in an area affected by
an oil spill, this provision may legitimize private suits not based on pe-
cuniary claims. An action for private nuisance may also lie, but only
if the claimant can show that his damages are distinct from those of the
rest of the communityY 4
Since private actions for damages resulting from oil spills are
seldom going to reflect the entire social cost of the pollution, private liti-
170. Cf. Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953) (fishermen may re-
cover their share of loss of prospective fish catches from owners of other vessels
which damaged their nets); Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md.
1966) (crew may recover in contract and admiralty for loss of wages from em-
ployer whose negligence caused collision and resulting unemployment for repair pe-
riod); Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1959) (vessel
owner may recover in tort for damage to vessel which may include loss of prospective
fish catches, but fishermen cannot recover except as favorites of the admiralty court);
Reefer Queen Co. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 73 Wash. 2d 774, 440 P.2d 488
(1968) (fishermen may recover for lost profits from lost fish catches in product lia-
bility action for defective sea winch installed on fishing vessel before fishing expedi-
tion).
171. See, e.g., Bostick v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 154 F. Supp. 744, 761-62
(D. Md. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1958).
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. V, 1970). See also Californids Environmental
Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §§ 21000-151 (Supp. 1970).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
174. Generally, an individual cannot recover damages for a public nuisance unless
he can show that he has sustained damage of a special character, distinct and different
from injuries suffered by the public generally. E.g., Pacific Inter-Club Yacht Ass'n v.
Morris, 197 F. Supp. 218, 222 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Chitwood v. South Carolina Elec. &
Gas Co., 51 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D.S.C. 1943). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF nH
LAW OF TORTS 606 (3d ed. 1964).
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gation will probably not discourage offshore drillers from polluting the




Damage to private persons resulting from hydrocarbon pollution of the
oceans must not be ignored, however, merely because it is not the cure-
all to the oil spill problem. New statutes are needed to make it easier
for individuals to recover their losses from oil damage from oil spills.
In California, legislation is needed to codify the absolute liability of the
offshore oil industry to persons damaged by oil pollution from offshore
drilling, and the Federal Government should follow suit. Legislation is
also needed to authorize the recovery of losses by those who have
indirect claims resulting from the adverse effects of an oil spill.
The right of recovery of those with "indirect claims" should extend to
fishermen for loss of prospective catches, inland hotel owners whose
business is reduced by a diminished number of guests in an area suf-
fering from oil pollution and local governments and private persons for
the impairment of the aesthetic qualities of an area. 176  If the legisla-
ture desires to limit the liability of the ocean petroleum industry for these
types of claims, a statutory limit on the total recovery permissible fol-
lowing an oil spill incident can be set. The ocean petroleum industry,
however, should not be entitled to escape liability for oil spill damage
because of the difficulty of establishing a causal connection between the
fact of pollution and the damage that is claimed.
Proposed pollution control legislation that would allow judg-
ments in private suits granting injunctions against pollution, 177 how-
ever, should be rejected. Creation of private attorneys general by
statute involves the danger of strike suits, and insofar as oil development
is concerned there are presently a sufficient number of public actions
175. One possibility for reducing the impotence of private litigation as a source of
constructive action to prevent the occurrence of pollution is innovative suits by environ-
mental action groups brought under the new standing rule for conservation organiza-
tions enunciated in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). A possible example is a suit to force private
inspections of offshore drilling operations to determine whether offshore operators
are using all available technological innovations designed to minimize the probability
of well blow-outs. Limited authority for this kind of action may be found in Renken v.
Harvey Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 160 (D. Ore. 1963), holding defendant's failure to
keep industrial process abreast of latest pollution control technology to be grounds for
an injunction requiring the adoption of new equipment.
176. All parties who suffer damage from offshore pollution should be afforded the
right to recover in the absence of proof by offshore drillers that there is no causal con-
nection between an oil spill resulting from offshore drilling operations and the claim
presented.
177. See, e.g., Hildebrand,Noise Pollution: an Introduction to the Problem and
an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 652, 683 n.140 (1970).
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that can be taken to substantially reduce the likelihood of projected oil
spill incidents. Implicit in this statement, of course, is the proposition
that public officials want to protect the marine environment from oil
spills and that they will use the legal tools at their disposal to ensure
that spills do not occur. Therein lies the nub of the oil spill problem.
Conclusion
The attitude that man cannot despoil the sea has too long pre-
vailed. The Santa Barbara Channel oil spill graphically demonstrated
that industrial development of marine resources threatens the delicate
marine environment and pose,- danger to the multiple use of ocean re-
sources.
The sea contains several important resources and has significant
aesthetic and recreational value; all must be protected. Regulatory
agencies charged with protecting the marine environment and its re-
sources, however, have not demonstrated the ability to preserve environ-
mental quality along the California coastline. More can and should be
done to protect the legitimate interest of the public in preserving the
marine environment free from pollution.
One agency, of either the State of California or the Federal Gov-
ernment, should be delegated specific responsibility for protecting
coastal areas. This agency should make use assessments of coastal
areas, taking into account all environmental and resource factors
r.17
Decisions to permit industrial development of marine petroleum re-
sources-currently the only ocean resource receiving widespread atten-
tion-could then be made on a generic basis. The decision to allow
development should pivot on two considerations: (1) that other impor-
tant marine resources are not peculiar to the proposed drilling area, and
(2) that development operations can be restricted in such a way that
the marine environment is not harmed.
Regardless of the means of regulation ultimately adopted, the
agencies charged with preserving the marine environment must be given
effective preventative sanctions and the wherewithal to enforce them.
Moreover, the administrative agencies must recognize the legitimate
public interest in protecting coastal areas from the adverse impact of in-
dustrial development by providing a forum for public hearings on the
178. The California Legislature has recently provided for a study of this kind
which will include an inventory of tide and submerged lands to identify lands possessing
unique environmental values, including aesthetic values. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§
6370-77, printed in WEsT's CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE ch. 1555, at 3176-78
(1970).
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priorities to be attached to conflicting uses of the offshore areas. The
coastal zones are some of the last open areas belonging to the public
and ultimately the public should be afforded the opportunity to deter-
mine how they are to be developed.
There are a number of additional measures which can feasibly be
taken to protect the marine environment. Regulatory agencies have for
too long relied on information furnished by private industry in evaluat-
ing subsurface geologic conditions. Effective regulation requires ade-
quate, independent sources of information on which to base a decision.
Similarly, both the state and the Federal Government have long ignored
the many uses to which the oceans may be put, in addition to the de-
velopment of petroleum reserves. Only by having efficient information-
gathering machinery can the administrative agencies rationally regulate
multiple ocean uses in the best interests of the public.
The oceans constitute one of the last frontiers available for human
exploration, and there is increasing evidence that man will rely on the
marine environment in the future more than he has ever done in the past.
Concerted legislative and judicial effort will be necessary to ensure that
the oceans are utilized wisely, for the benefit of industry and the public
alike, and not for the single-minded exploitation that has characterized
their use in the past.
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